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Abstract 
Purpose: Recent advancements in technology have enabled railway organizations to 
shift from manual to computer based automated interlocking systems for increasing 
their efficiency and profits. Since automated systems are complex and interlocking sys-
tems are safety critical systems, these systems should be modeled and verified against 
safety requirements to weed out any design bugs which might lead to catastrophes 
during their system life cycles. In this study, we model software based automated inter-
locking control system of a train station, located at Rawalpindi Cantt (Pakistan).
Methods: We have modeled software based automated interlocking control system 
using timed automata and verified its correctness using UPPAAL model checking soft-
ware. Timed automata have successfully been used for the modeling and verification of 
real-time systems.
Results: We constructed a real-time model of railyard interlocking system by employ-
ing a model-checking approach to determine behavior of the model under various 
conditions. The model checker ascertains the absence of errors in a system by inspect-
ing all the possible states or scenarios of the modeled system. The results show that 
important properties related to the safety of the designed interlocking system of the 
railyard management system can be verified using our presented approach. These 
properties ranged from collision and de-railment avoidance to checking the correct 
error handling functionality of the timed automata models.
Conclusions: The final modular design can easily adapt to the route upgrades and 
changes within the station by simple variable adjustments. Based on the laid down 
methodology and verification techniques, this study can be further built upon, 
extended and linked to cover the shunting aspect of the train station operations, run 
through operations, introducing automatic train stop (ATS) functionality and recom-
mend three to four aspect traffic signaling for the train station. This study takes a first 
step in providing an indigenous solution to an indigenous problem of designing an 
upgraded and verified signaling infrastructure for Pakistan Railway’s Rawalpindi Cantt 
train station.
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Background
This paper is an extension of work originally presented in Proceedings of the Frontiers 
of Information Technology Conference 2015 (Khan et al. 2015). This extension includes 
route cancellation requests and addition of more verification properties for the designed 
system.
Railways around the world have either introduced or they are in the process of intro-
ducing automation in their day to day operations by utilizing the state of the art com-
mercial off the shelf (COTS) information and technology (IT) solutions. Automation of 
processes is a major contributer to efficiency and reduction in operating and maintenance 
costs. However, in the interest of avoiding faults during design and development of safety 
critical IT applications such as interlocking systems, it is always recommended to carry 
out modeling and verification of the target system (Brown 2000). It is considered an enor-
mous challenge to weed out faults in a safety critical real time system. The methods of 
peer review, dynamic testing and simulation (Baier and Katoen 2008) of software can-
not be relied upon to completely remove all the errors which in these cases might lead 
to accidents causing loss of man and material. The present study attempts to model and 
verify interlocking system of passenger lines of Rawalpindi Cantt Train Yard using a for-
mal method modeling technique, which will be a first step in charting out an indigenous 
solution to the problem of automating yard operations for Rawalpindi Cantt train station.
The recent major work in automata modeling of rail interlocking systems has been 
done in Turkish National Railway Signalization Project (Söylemez et al. 2011; Turk et al. 
2011; Dincel and Kurtulan 2012) which explain in detail techniques in how to model rail 
interlocking system modules, simultaneously pointing out the pitfall of state explosion 
for large models. They have provided a case study for employing their modeling meth-
ods to a small rail yard. Ferrari et al. (2011) discuss the interlocking systems modeled 
and verified in NuSMV (Cimatti et al. 2002) and SPIN (Holzmann 2004) model checking 
tools. Our study is unique in the fact that modeling and verification of mid to large size 
railway yard is being undertaken in UPPAAL model checker (Larsen et al. 1997) using 
timed automata.
One of the major influences of this study is a paper by Szpyrka (2008) in which he gives 
the methodology to extract relevant data out of a train station by making relationship 
tables from its interlocking tables. Kanso et al. (2009), Fokkink et al. (1998) and Fokkink 
(1996) present a detailed verification strategy for the railway interlocking systems.
Railway signaling
Railway lines are divided into sections, called blocks (Satish and Agarwal 2007), each of 
which is guarded by a traffic signal at its entrance. Hence, a block begins and ends with 
signals. To enter a block by a train, a permissive signal must be indicated by the traffic 
signal. Railway traffic signals work in conjunction with point machines to organize safe 
passage of trains through the tracks. Following are the main elements of interest in a 
train station.
Track circuit
A track circuit is a sensor, which is a simple electrical logic circuit which detects the 
presence of a train on a track. AC or DC current is present in the two parallel rail lines 
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and whenever a train moves over the tracks, the circuit is closed and the presence of 
train is detected.
Signal
Signals authorize the movement of trains. The main signals involved in Rawalpindi Cantt 
train station are of the two aspect semaphore type (stop and go).
Points
Unlike cars, trains cannot change their direction independently. They require mechani-
cal devices called points to provide passage from one track to another.
Traffic control center
Train movements are controlled and monitored from this facility. At present a simple 
display shows the position of trains in the yard using track circuits. With the help of 
electrical slotting, the final adjustment of light signals and switches are carried out by 
the cabin operators.
Control cabins
These cabins execute switches and signals through mechanical levers which are con-
nected to these elements via steel wires. The cabin operators drive these elements after 
consulting the interlocking tables. These cabins are the middle men which the proposed 
software based automated interlocking system design aims to remove.
Rawalpindi Cantt train yard
The Rawalpindi train yard has ten platforms in total. Five platforms are reserved for pas-
sengers while the rest are for goods. Due to the decline in railway operations, only the 
passenger platforms have remained operational. Furthermore, only the passenger plat-
forms and their lines have a track detection circuit installed. This station is equipped 
with warner, home, starter, advance starter, shunting and outer signals (Satish and Agar-
wal 2007).
Rawalpindi Cantt station has a distributed control for its rail management system, 
with four lever frame cabins, three of which are interlock enabled. This distributed con-
trol system employs mechanical lever frames with slides as an interlocking system, pro-
viding fixed block interlock signaling services within the train yard. The traffic signals 
are of two aspect semaphore type and the points are mechanically engaged. The layout 
of Rawalpindi Cantt train yard with only the five passenger lines is shown in Fig. 1.
For the conducting safe movement (excluding shunting) for five passenger lines of the 
yard, there are 25 semaphore signals and 27 mechanically operated points which are 
controlled via three lever frame cabins.
Interlocking system
Interlocking system (IS) is the personification of safety regulations which governs the 
safe operation of any system, which in our case is safe movement of trains through a 
train yard. Its job is to filter out the safe from unsafe inputs, which might cause harm to 
the system or its users.
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Rail management system architecture
Interlocking is a safety layer which lies between the input receiving layer (interface layer) 
and the output layer (infrastructure layer), making sure only the safe inputs are sifted 
through to become outputs, rejecting those instructions which might cause collision 
or derailing. Figure 2 accurately shows the position of the interlocking layer within the 
overall rail management system (Fokkink et al. 1998; Moler et al. 2012; James et al. 2014). 
Interface layer is the one from which the operator assigns tasks to the program e.g. select 
and assign a route to a train. It maybe called the user interface (UI) of the (software) 
system. The interlocking layer checks the inputs from the interface layer i.e. if they are 
correct in terms of not violating safety which might result in collision or derailing. After 
checking the input, relevant orders to the field elements are given to the infrastructure 
layer, which embodies the field elements of the yard. The feedback of the states from the 
infrastructure layer is relayed to the interface layer via the interlocking layer. This study 
focuses on the interlocking layer of the automated control and management system of a 
rail yard.
Design of safety critical systems
EN 50128 (Boulanger 2015), is a European derivative standard of IEC 61508 (Brown 
2000) which focuses on safety management techniques specifically for design and 
development of railway applications. The umbrella standard IEC 61508 (Brown 2000) 











































Fig. 1 Layout of passenger Rawalpindi Cantt train yard. Five passenger lines of the Rawalpindi Cantt train 
yard are shown with the position of signals, their alphanumeric designations and the position of lever frame 
cabins. Layout is not per actual scale
Fig. 2 System architecture. This diagram indicates the position of interlocking system in a rail yard manage-
ment system hierarchy
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methods are highly recommended for modeling safety critical systems such as railway 
interlocking systems which fall under SIL 4 category (Brown 2000; Vu et al. 2014).
Organization of the paper
The paper starts with the background knowledge of railway interlocking system. Then, 
the methodology used in this study is described in “Methods” section. The design is pro-
posed in “Design of interlocking system” section. The results acquired by using the mod-
eling and verification approaches for the interlocking system are illustrated in “Results 
and discussion” section along with the discussions based on the safety aspects of the 
designed system. Finally, fifth section concludes this paper.
Methods
Timed automata
“An automata is a machine which evolves from one state to another under the action of 
transitions” (Bérard et al. 2013).
Definition 1 (Timed Automata) A timed automaton (TA) is a structure (Olderog and 
Dierks 2008), 〈L,B,X,I,E,lini〉, where
  • L is a finite set of locations
  • B is a finite set of channels with elements a,b or any other name like input as in Fig. 3. 
For each channel a there are two actions: a? denotes an input and a! is the corre-
sponding output on the channel a.
  • X is a finite set of clocks. A clock is a continuously evolving variable with a rate of 1.
  • I: L → ∮  (X) is a mapping that assigns to each location a clock constraint, its invari-
ant
  • E ⊆ L × B?! × 
∮
(X) × P(X) × L is the set of directed edges. An element (l, α, ϕ, Y, l′) ε E 
describes an edge from location l to location l’ labeled with the action α, the guard ϕ, 
and the set Y of clocks that will be reset.
  • lini ∈ initial location of L
















Fig. 3 Watchdog timed automaton where start and error are the two states, input is the reception channel 
and x is the clock variable
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A watch dog timer is a timer which is employed as a forward error correction mecha-
nism to detect and recover from system malfunctions. This simple example illustrates 
a timed automaton with two states i.e. “start” and “error”. The timed automaton is ini-
tially in the “start” state, and has the invariant value of ≤6 time units. The system waits 
to receive input for five time units. If input is received within this time, clock is reset 
and the timed automaton remains in this location. If, however, an input is not received 
within five time units, then the timed automaton moves to the next (“error”) location, 
exiting from a potentially never ending wait. Figure  4 shows values of clock for this 
watchdog timed automaton.
Parallel composition
More than one automata representing subsystems can be combined together in a paral-
lel composition to form a larger system.
Definition 2 The parallel composition (Olderog and Dierks 2008) TAi(TA1 ‖ TA2) of 
two timed automata TA1 and TA2 is expressed as
i = 1, 2, with disjoint sets of clocks X1 and X2 yields the timed automaton
Conjunction of location invariants: I(l1, l2) ⇔ I1(l1) ∧ I2(l2).
The transition relation E is constructed by the following rules:
Handshake communication: synchronizing a! with a? yields τ (internal action), i.e. if 
(l1 , α, ϕ1, Y1, l′1) ε E1 and (l2, α˜, ϕ2, Y2, l′2) ε E2
{ α, α˜ } = {a!, a?} then also
((l1, l2), τ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, Y1 ∪ Y2, (l′1, l′2)) ε E.
Asynchrony: if (l1, α, ϕ1, Y1, l′1) ε E1 then for all l2 ε L2 also
((l1, l2), α,ϕ1, Y1, (l’1, l2)) ε E
and inversely, if (l2, α, ϕ2, Y2, l’2) ε E2 then for all l1 ε L1 also
((l1, l2), α,ϕ2, Y2, (l1, l’2)) ε E
TAi = (Li,Bi,Xi, Ii,Ei, lini,i)
TA1 � TA2 = (L1 × L2,B1 ∪ B2,X1 ∪ X2, I ,E, (lini,1, lini,2))
Fig. 4 Clock values
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Model checking
Model checking is an automated formal verification technique to ascertain the absence 
of errors in a suitable system through systemic inspection of all the states of the model 
(Baier and Katoen 2008). The absence of errors is checked via computational tree logic 
(CTL) (Clarke and Emerson 1982) or linear temporal logic (LTL) (Pnueli 1977) state-
ments. CTL is a branching time logic where as LTL, as the name signifies has a linear 
time perspective.
The branching perspective of CTL is more suitable for verifying correctness of a safety 
critical system because all possible states in all possible computational paths are ascer-
tained for the absence of a safety negating state. A CTL statement or formula expresses 
the properties and perspective behavior of the model. The CTL statements are formed 
by using temporal and logical operators.
Temporal operators
The temporal operators (Bérard et al. 2013) of CTL are
A: In All possible computational paths, a property will always be satisfied.
E: There Exists a path where a property will always be satisfied.
F: The exits a state in the unspecified Future where a property will be satisfied.
G: A property will Globally be satisfied in the future of a path.
Logical operators
The mostly commonly used logical operators are
¬: Negation or the not operator





A real time system is a reactive system, which responds to an input within a definite 
amount of time (Olderog and Dierks 2008). A real time system can be a safety critical 
system, where the real time constraints are extracted from the safety requirements of 
that system. A real time system has the following properties:
Definition 3 (Safety property) This property states that a bad event should never occur.
In CTL it expressed by the temporal combinators as (Bérard et al. 2013)
where ϕ denotes a bad event.
Definition 4 (Liveness property) Liveness property states that something good will 
eventually occur.
This property is expressed (Bérard et al. 2013) in CTL form as
AG¬ϕ
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where ϕ is an event which eventually occurs after ψ.
Definition 5 (Bounded response property) Bounded response property states that a 
desired response due to an input will occur within a defined time interval.
In timed CTL it can be expressed as
where <5 s denotes that when ψ occurs, ϕ should be observed in less that 5 s.
Definition 6 (Duration property) This property states that the amount of time a real 
time system will be in its critical condition, that time should be a bounded interval.
In timed CTL it can be expressed as
where ϕ is the critical condition for at least five 5 s.
UPPAAL
UPPAAL (Larsen et al. 1997) is a multi-platform timed automata model checker which 
is used for modeling, simulating and verifying real time systems. Apart from a graphical 




Fig. 5 UPPAAL tool box. This figure shows the UPPAAL toolbox in simulation mode
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command line utility, verifyta, for performing verification in a Linux or windows ter-
minal with the help of a query file. A query file contains the CTL formulas which are 
required to be checked by the model checker.
UPPAAL (Larsen et  al. 1997) tool, however, has certain limitations in using timed 
CTL formulas as it can only handle formulas of the type AGψ, AFψ, EGψ, EFψ and 
AG[ψ ⇒ AFϕ] (denoted as → in UPPAAL), with no nesting allowed (Behrmann et al. 
2004). Figure 6 shows the computational trees of the aforementioned formulas. Despite 
this constraint, this tool was successfully used for the real time modeling and verification 
of the interlocking system of Rawalpindi Cantt train yard. UPPAAL (Larsen et al. 1997) 
uses an extended timed automata structure (Olderog and Dierks 2008), appending more 
elements in the basic timed automata (TA) structure.
Definition 7 (UPPAAL extended timed automaton) An extended timed automaton 
(Olderog and Dierks 2008) Ae is a structure






















EFφ: There exits a computational path where
 φ eventually holds
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Fig. 6 Temporal combinators
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where L, B, X, I and lini are the same as the pure timed automaton and
  • C ⊆ L is a set of committed locations
  • U ⊆ B is a set of urgent channels
  • V is a set of data variables, with typical element ν
  • E ⊆ L × B?! × 
∮
(X, V) × P(X, V) × L is the set of directed edges. An element (l, α, ϕ, Y, 
l′) ε E describes an edge from location l to location l′ labeled with the action α, the 
guard ϕ, and the set Y of clocks that will be reset.
  • If (l, α, ϕ, Y, l′) ε E and chan(α) ⊆ U then ϕ = true. This condition prevents that urgent 
actions are prohibited by guards.
Urgent locations
UPPAAL (Larsen et al. 1997) tool has a feature of urgent locations, which are essentially 
locations with invariant clock value ≤0. When a system is in an urgent location, time 
cannot pass until the system has left this location. These locations are denoted with the 
letter “U”. Imprudent and excessive use of urgent locations may result in timelocks in the 
system.
Committed locations
Committed locations are same as that of urgent locations, except that when a system is 
in a committed location, the next transition must be from this location. It is represented 
by the letter “C”. Using this location has an added benefit of not being stored in memory 
during running of verification of a system (default options). A drawback of using com-
mitted locations can be the observance of timelocks and/or deadlocks, if they are used 
imprudently.
Urgent channel
An urgent channel is a type of channel declaration offered by UPPAAL (Larsen et  al. 
1997) tool. When a channel is declared urgent, the transition pertaining to that channel 
will fire immediately upon being enabled. A drawback of using urgent channels is that 
the urgent channel guard cannot contain a clock variable.
Modeling scope and assumptions
In order to bring down the complexity of the model as well as to avoid the state explosion 
problem when analyzing railway systems, we make the following assumptions regarding 
train movement and signaling operations:
  • The train drivers obey the signals at all times.
  • Train shunting is not considered.
  • This model does not include the subsidiary signals such as shunting and junction 
indicators.
  • This model does not include level crossings.
Ae =
〈
L,C ,B,U ,X ,V , I ,E, lini
〉
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  • This model caters for the five passenger lines of the yard only.
  • Two aspect traffic signals are used.
  • There are no conflicts of train movements with the other adjacent stations.
Control tables
Control tables are a set of tables which govern the functioning of the interlocking layer. 
These tables are derived from the interlocking tables of the train yard. Every train yard 
has its distinct interlocking tables. Table  1 shows what signals and points (with their 
positions) must be engaged to have a safe route charted out for the incoming train.
Conflicts table
Table 2 is the heart of the interlocking system. It lists all the routes in x and y axes and 
marks out the routes which are in conflict with other routes, which if left unlocked (left 
accessible) will result in collision of trains. Eighteen routes have been defined and their 




Interlocking system is the safety ensuring layer of a rail yard management system. 
Figure  2 shows information flow (Fokkink et  al. 1998; Moler et  al. 2012; James et  al. 
2014) in a rail yard management system. It’s purpose is to check and restrict processes 
which are hazard prone.
Table 1 Route dependencies
Routes Point position Signal
Normal Reverse
Down home 2 29t, 37t 18t, 36t 3t, 1t (down outer)
Down to main line 18t 4t, 1t (down outer)
Route from down main line to no. 3 44, 59 53, 68 75
Route from down mainline to no. 4 53, 59 40, 68 78
Route from down mainline to no. 5 59, 68 76
Up home 3 37c, 42c, 53c, 69c 39c 80c (up outer), 79c
Up home 4 39c, 42c, 53c, 69c 80c (up outer), 78c
Up home 5 44c, 57c, 67c 33c, 34c, 69c 80c (up outer), 75c
Up start 1 18t 22t 58t, 57t (up adv starter)
Up start 2 18t 22t 59t, 57t (up adv starter)
Up starter from no. 3 37t, 47, 53 32
Up starter from no. 4 37t, 38 40, 57 31
Up starter from no. 5 36 72
Up starting 3 and 4 from main line 60t, 57t
Up starting 5 from to main line 32t 30t 48t, 57t
Down start 3 69c 44c 5c, 10c (down adv starter)
Down start 4 69c 30c 9c, 10c (down adv starter)
Down start 5 69c 7c, 10c (down adv starter)
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Keeping in view of the aforementioned goal, different aspects of the interlocking sys-
tem are designed in a modular structure using the UPPAAL tool (Larsen et  al. 1997). 
Each module, called a template in UPPAAL tool (Larsen et  al. 1997), performs a spe-
cific function in the IS. The basic process flow in the IS design is shown in Fig. 7 and 
described as follows:
  • Whenever a route is requested, it is checked whether there are routes, which are in 
conflict to this route are selected. If so, then the route request is denied.
Fig. 7 Flowchart. This flow chart describes the sequence of events to be undertaken by an interlocking 
system
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  • If no conflicting routes are in operation then it is checked if, the tracks of the selected 
route are occupied or not. If they are occupied, then the request is denied.
  • If, however, the intended tracks are unoccupied, then the points on that route are 
ordered to move to their desired positions and their feedback is awaited (watch-dog 
timer). If there is no feedback in a stipulated amount of time, then it is assumed that 
a problem has occurred with a point and the route request is again denied.
  • When the points are in their desired position, they are locked. The term point lock 
means that the points in a route will not be able to change their positions when a 
train is traversing over it.
  • After all the points are in their desired positions then as a precaution the route 
tracks are again checked for emptiness. If they are empty, then the requisite signal(s) 
are ordered to turn green and their feedback is awaited. If, however, no feedback 
is received within a stipulated amount of time, it is again assumed that a fault has 
occurred with the signal(s) and the route request is denied.
  • When all signals are green, a train is given permission to traverse that route. During 
its journey, all signals which are being crossed by the train are ordered to turn red.
  • A route cancellation by the train dispatcher will only be possible when the route sig-
nals are green and the train has not entered the route. When a cancellation com-
mand is initiated, the light signals of the route are turned immediately “red” and the 
routes are unlocked and points access granted only after a set amount of delay.
Safety design
For an interlocking system, safety is of the prime concern.
Definition 8 Safety, in terms of a railway based interlocking system is defined as 
(Moler et al. 2012)
No collision
No collision (Antoni and Ammad 2008), as shown in Fig. 8 is an important property for 
safe transition within a yard, which states that whenever there is a train en-route, there is 
no possibility that
Safety = no collision ∩ no derailment
Fig. 8 Collision. Trains headed towards collision on a merging route
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  • Some other train will collide from rear
  • Crash into some other stationary or moving train
  • Collide into the main body of some other train which is moving on a merging track
  • Crash with another train whose some part of the route is shared by the first train
  • Collide head to head with a train coming from opposing direction
No derailment
No derailment means there is no possibility that whenever a train is moving over a point 
enroute towards its destination, that point suddenly changes its orientation, causing the 
train to move in two directions at once resulting in derailment. So, safety criteria is that 
once the points are being put in reverse or normal position, they have to be unoccupied 
(Fokkink 1996). Figure 9 shows derailing of a train due to a point changing its orienta-
tion when a train is crossing over it. Table 3 shows the possibility of derailment in routes 
where there are shared points which can move in two directions.
Real time constraints
Another important aspect of safety is that, whenever a field actuator is ordered to 
do a task, it should deliver its feedback in a timely manner (Yildirim et al. 2010). In 
real world applications there are many possibilities of equipment malfunctions espe-
cially in hazard prone places like an open rail yard. Field equipment (called wayside 
equipment) malfunctions in an open rail yard can range from inherent mean time 
between failures (MTBF) of the equipment to slicing off of communication cables 
by a donkey cart which may happen to cross over the railway lines. The interlock-
ing system (IS) can command a wayside equipment to do a job, which may or may 
not be received and may or may not be acted upon. The design of the IS must cater 
for this and the best solution to satisfy all these possibilities is the use of a watchdog 
timer. A wayside equipment may be able to do a job, but its failure to give feedback 
in a stipulated amount of time will be considered as a fault/error by the interlocking 
system and appropriate action will be taken in that regard (Yildirim et al. 2010). The 
stipulated time is defined as the max rated response time of an equipment and the 
system lag (delay) time. System time lag represents the adjusted inherent loss of time 
in receiving a response from a field equipment. These response times are usually rated 
in datasheets (Siemens 2015) of the wayside equipment. This feature is implemented 
in “point driver” and “signal driver” timed automata modules, which are described in 
the next section.
Fig. 9 Derailment. A train is being derailed due to a point changing it orientation during the transit of a train
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Design of elements
The proposed IS design is modular in structure using the UPPAAL tool (Larsen et al. 
1997). Each module, called a template in UPPAAL toolbox (Larsen et al. 1997), per-
forms a specific function in the IS. Templates are instantiated into processes in the 
system declarations section of UPPAAL tool (Larsen et  al. 1997) and eventually, rel-
evant processes are integrated together in a parallel composition (Olderog and Dierks 
2008) using system command in  system declarations section to form a complete sys-
tem. All variables used in the design are global variables except for clock variables and 
otherwise specifically mentioned local variables. Details of different modules of the 
design are described below and their holistic relationship with each other via channels 
is shown in Fig. 10.
Point automaton
Electric point machines are devices with electrical motors. The response time, in case of 
an electric point machine is called the throwing time. Throwing times are usually rated in 
datasheets (Siemens 2015) of the machine.
The requirement of the automaton design for points is that it should be as simple and 
as small as possible, so as to aid in remedying the state explosion problem. The other 
Point Driver
         Timed                          
      Automaton
Light Driver 
           Timed 



















   
















Fig. 10 Automata communication map. The figure shows the communication of automata with each other 
via channels, which are described over arrows. The directional arrows originating from automata represent the 
output channels (!) of that automata, while the directed automata have the input channels (?)
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requirement is that it should have an element of error in the design, in that there should 
be a possibility that the point sometimes is unable to give feedback within a stipulated 
amount of time (we used 6  s), simulating error. This will help in designing correct IS 
which caters for faulty equipment. “NormalPos” is the initial state representing nor-
mal position, which is one of two positions for a point machine, as shown in Fig.  11. 
“ReversePos” state stands for reverse position. The reception channels are “reverse” and 
“normal” while the automaton sends confirmation signals via “Nconfirm”(for normal) 
and “Rconfirm”(for reverse) channels.
Signals light automaton
Figure 12 shows the signal light automaton. To model railway signal light, it is important 
to keep in mind the construction of railway signal light to accurately model its mecha-
nism and to avoid the unnecessary addition of states resulting in state explosion. The 
requirements are similar as that of the point machine. The difference being that error 
induction is with the green signal aspect only. Due to the fail-safe nature of traffic light 
equipment, which translates to any scenario where there is doubt/issue with communi-
cation with the control center, the light will always display a most restrictive aspect i.e. 
red (Signals 2013a). To confirm the occurrence of red signal i.e. “confirmred”, the “con-
firmred” channel is defined as an urgent channel. No error is assumed in going Red for 
Fig. 11 Point automaton where NormalPos and ReversePos are the two states and reverse, Rconfirm, normal 
and Nconfirm are the communication channels
Two Aspect 
Fig. 12 Light automaton where red and green are the two states and dored, confirmred, dogreen and confirm-
green are the communication channels
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light signal, however for the Green aspect, a possibility of error is made to be present 
in the shape of a regular channel “confirmgreen”, due to which a transition may or may 
not be fired as soon as the light automaton is given command to turn green. This pre-
sents a possibility of error which the interlocking system is designed to handle. Since 
the response time of electric lights to change their aspects is almost instantaneous, the 
timeout used here is 2 s representing system communication lag time
Route automaton
Route automaton, shown in Fig. 13 is a holistic abstraction of the track circuits present 
in a particular route. Its purpose is to simulate occupation of a route with the entering 
and leaving of a train in a particular route. If the train enters the beginning part of the 
route, as was intended, then the first track circuit present in that route detects its pres-
ence, sends a message “trainEnter”, and moves to “trackOccupied” state. When it leaves 
the route by passing over the last track circuit in the route, the “trainLeave” message is 
fired and the automaton comes in “emptyTrack” state.
If, however, track circuits other than the first track circuit of the route detects the pres-
ence of a train, a transition is fired which takes the automaton in the “trackOccupied” 
state with setting the value of a boolean variable “tmp” as 1. As described earlier, this is 
to randomly simulate the occupation of the route and judge the response of the inter-
locking design. When this random train leaves the tracks, it takes automaton to its “emp-
tyTrack” state by resetting the “tmp” variable to zero.
The message channels “checkOccu” is used by the route selection automaton to check 
if the route is occupied or empty, with the message channels “confirmOccu” and “con-
firmNoccu” giving the desired feedback respectively.
An addition can be be made, with a new place in the route, which symbolizes a train 
docking at a platform for embarking/disembarking it’s load. Only those routes which 
are arriving at platforms are expressed with this deviation as shown in Fig. 14. When-
ever a train is docked, and has not left a route, another train cannot be received in that 
route, protecting it from collision. The place docked is arrived after the trainLeave signal 
is fired. This ensures that all conflicting routes are released, but any train coming into 
this track is forbidden due to built-in safety which checks un-occupancy of every route, 
before it is being assigned to it.
Fig. 13 Route automaton where trackOccupied, checkoccupied, emptyTrack and checkempty are the locations, 
trainEnter, trainLeave, checkOccu, confirmOccu and confirmNoccu are the communication channels and tmp is 
the local boolean variable
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Fig. 14 Route automaton with platform docking where trackOccupied, checkoccupied, emptyTrack,docked and 
checkempty are the locations, trainEnter, trainLeave, checkOccu, confirmOccu and confirmNoccu are the com-
munication channels and tmp is the local boolean variable
Committed locations are used to reduce the unnecessary state space. This has the draw 
back of assuming that the trains will move instantaneously from the docked place.
Route selection automaton
This is the main driver automaton which calls other automata to perform specific func-
tions which give feedback on the actions taken.
This automaton has versions dependent upon the number of conflicting routes 
involved. The version in Fig. 15 handles three conflicting routes. The number of boolean 
variables used in this automaton depends upon the total number of conflicting routes 
with the additional one extra boolean variable.
The additional variable is “TickS”, which handles the self assignment of the route, 
which is put out of use by setting of its flag. The first transition from place “start” to 
“occupation” has three important properties. The first is the guard, which restricts this 
transition unless all route boolean variables are unset (having zero value). This guard is 
represented as
This important feature runs route boolean variables against the logic AND, ensuring 
that the automaton remains in its initial place until this logic is satisfied, meaning no 
other conflicting routes are ever engaged which might cause collision or derailment of 
the train.
When the guard is satisfied, the automaton renders, the route in question and its con-
flicting routes, out of action by setting (update value to 1) the boolean variables.
The third property of the transition is the action message “checkOccu”. This message 
checks (by calling out to Route automaton) whether the track segments of the route in 
question are empty or occupied. If the route is occupied, the message “confirmOccu” is 
received, taking the automaton to “clearance” state, which ultimately takes the automa-
ton to it’s initial state by resetting all the route boolean variables, allowing conflicting 
routes to be engaged.
Guard: tickS == 0& tick == 0& tick2 == 0& tick3 == 0
Update: tickS = tick = tick2 = tick3 = 1
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After having received confirmation via “confirmNoccu”, that the intended route is not 
occupied, the automaton moves to next state “point_order” which directs the required 
points to assume their positions via “activate” action message. This message calls upon 
the point driver timed automaton into action which passes the message of “topconfirm”, 
in-case of successful operation or “toperror”, in-case of failure to do the required task. 
The failure leads the automaton to the “clearance” state and then eventually to the ini-
tial state by releasing all the conflicting routes for operation by resetting the boolean 
variables. After successful operation of the points, “signal_order” state is reached, which 
finally orders the traffic signals to assume green color via “signalorder” action message to 
allow trains to enter the route. “signalorder” message instantiates the signals driver timed 
automata, which responds to route selection automaton with the messages of “allgreen” 
and “lterror” for success and failure, respectively. The failure to change lights to their 
green colors results in the automaton coming in the “end_wait” state. In this state the 
automaton is waiting for all the lights to be turned red (some might have been turned 
green previously in the sequence) via the “ended” synchronized reception channel which 
leads to the “clearance” state. All the out of play routes are again made available by reset-
ting the boolean route variables and the automaton comes back to its initial state. Upon 
successful change of lights to green, the automaton comes in the “ready” state, which 
























Fig. 15 Route selection automaton with three conflicting routes where start, occupation, point_order, point_
confirmation, signal_order, light_set_confirmation, ready and clearance are the states, checkOccu, confirm-
Noccu, confirmOccu, cancelsignal,activate, topconfirm, toperror, allgreen, lterror and ended are the channels and 
tickS,tick,tick2 and tick3 are boolean variables
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Fig. 16 Point driver timed automaton with two point engagement where start, point1, point2, error, watch-
dog1, watchdog2 and all_done are the states, activate, act_point1, confirm1, act_point2, confirm2, toperror and 
topconfirm are the channels and x is the clock variable
pass the route and lights be turned to red via the “ended” synchronized reception chan-
nel. The automaton arrives at its initial state by releasing all the previously locked routes.
A utility function of cancelsignal is added into the automaton. This is added to give 
the train dispatcher the flexibility of operations by allowing him to cancel a route, if the 
intended train has not already entered the green lit route. When a route is canceled, the 
signal lights of the selected route are immediately turned red and the routes are unlocked 
after a period of set delay so as to give reaction and stopping time to the train drivers. 
Though this functionality is instantiated at the route selection automata by the triggering 
of the “cancelsignal” channel, but it actually transpires in the light driver timed automata.
Points driver timed automaton
This timed automaton module, shown in Fig. 16, is activated by routes selection autom-
aton via “activate” reception channel, which orders it to set an array of points for a 
route. As opposed to routes selection automaton, it is a timed automaton. When this 
timed automaton is summoned into action, it gives messages to the designated points 
to assume a particular position. A point can have two positions, namely “normal” and 
“reverse”.
When points driver timed automaton instructs a point to assume a particular position, 
it expects confirmation within a stipulated amount of time (Signals 2013b). As an exam-
ple we have taken Siemens point machine, S 700 (Siemens 2015), having a throwing time 
of 5 s. By adding 1 s of system delay, we are arrived at six time units of delay. This delay is 
taken only as an example and can be as large as per requirement (Signals 2013c).
As mentioned earlier, to circumvent the possibility of critical errors which can have 
catastrophic results, a timed response is a necessity. With a timed response from the 
point, the next point is ordered to take it’s designated position and so on. With success-
ful assumption of all points to their desired position, a “topconfirm” message is passed 
to the route selection automata. Without a timed response from any point, it is assumed 
that something has gone wrong and “toperror” message is generated. Each route has its 
distinct set of points at particular positions. Hence every timed automaton is different 
for a particular route. The timed automaton shown in Fig. 16 can linearly expanded or 
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reduced for more or less than two points by simply adding or reducing locations and 
transitions for new points.
Signals driver timed automaton
After the successful engagement of points, the route selection automaton, finally sum-
mons the signals driver timed automaton module, Fig. 17, to display green aspects on 
the traffic signal lights. As a precaution before engaging the signals, this timed autom-
aton again checks the route for occupancy. It only proceeds when the route is empty, 
other wise it generates an error and exits.
This timed automaton is complicated, as unlike points driver timed automaton, the 
signals must be turned back to their restrictive aspects (red signal) after they are turned 
green.
In order to design this timed automaton, the functioning of railway lights must be kept 
in mind. All field elements since the early era of railroading have always been designed 
with safety in mind. For example the semaphore signals have fail-safe functionality in 
that, the signal in the case of cutting of the communication steel wire, will result in 
automatic display the Red aspect of the signal. Hence, there is no chance of accident, 
as the system is designed in such a way that the traffic indication system will always fall 
towards a most restrictive aspect when in error (Signals 2013a). Similarly, the modern 
Fig. 17 Light driver timed automaton with controlling two lights. start, occupancy, light1, light2, light1Red, 
light2Red, watchdog1, watchdog2,error, send_confirmation, greenall, conra, conrac, conrb, conrbc, cancelwait, 
cancel, light2red, light2redc, train_leave and exit are the states, signalorder, cancelsignal, checkOccu, confir-
mOccu, confirmNoccu, dogreen1, dored1, confirmgreen1, confirmred1, lterror, dogreen2, dored2, confirmgreen2, 
confirmred2, allgreen, trainEnter, trainLeave and ended are the channels, a is a boolean variable and x is the 
clock variable
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electronic lights have retained the same operating principle, in that the lights will only 
display green signal when there is a signal present from the control station to display this 
aspect. As and when this signal is lost, the light will fall to its restrictive aspect, i.e. Red.
Like the point driver timed automaton whenever a command is given to the light to 
change color, its feedback within a stipulated amount of time is awaited. In case of lights, 
we have used 2 s. If feedback is received within this time, the next signal is ordered to 
turn to green. When all the lights are turned green, a message “allgreen” is passed to the 
route selection automaton, and the train is awaited to traverse the track. If, however, at 
any point feedback is not received in time, then a message “lterror” is passed to the route 
selection automata, and all the signals are given a command to turn to their red posi-
tions as there is an error in the field elements of the route. After this sequence is com-
pleted, a message “ended” is passed on to the route selection automaton to indicate that 
all the light driver timed automaton sequences have concluded. An additional feature of 
route cancellation is introduced in this automaton. In a route cancellation scenario, if 
the train dispatcher, decides to abruptly cancel the route due any or no reason (Söylemez 
et al. 2011), then all lights signals in that route will be ordered to turn red. However, the 
points and the routes will be locked for a cushion period (we have used 60 s), to give the 
trains which may be moving towards or with-in a route a time to adjust to this change. 
This cushion time can be any amount of time recommended for a particular station or of 
the operator’s choosing with the safety of the station in mind. This timed automaton can 
be reduced to act as a single light driver by removing the extra locations and transitions 
of the second light.
Safety properties
Safety properties relevant to our IS are expressed as:
Collision avoidance property
1. At all times when a route selection automaton is not in its initial state, then all other 
conflicting route selection automata are in their initial state. In CTL form this prop-
erty can be expressed as 
where b, c and d are conflicting routes to a and “start” is the initial location of the 
automata. This property outlines collision freedom in the sense that whenever a route 
is engaged, i.e. a route selection automaton (e.g. a) is not in its initial state, then there 
is no chance that a train on conflicting routes (i.e. b, c and d) will be operating, as those 
conflicting routes will never be set, marked by the fact that all conflicting route selection 
automata are stuck in their initial state for the entire duration.
No derailment property
2. Until and unless a train has left a route or arrived at the destination platform, the 
points falling into that route at all times are at their required position (r and s). 
where p.start signifies the start state of a light driver timed automata and r and s 
denote the point orientation with in that route.
(1)p1 = AG[¬a.start ⇒ (b.start ∧ c.start ∧ d.start)]
(2)p2 = AG¬p.start ⇒ r ∧ s
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The property expressed in formula 2 exists to verify that if a train is given green signal to 
enter a route, the underlying point(s) present in that route will not change their orienta-
tion until the train movement over that route is complete and the routes are unlocked. 
If the points change their position during this movement, it will result in the train going 
in two directions at once, causing derailment. The CTL statement utilizes the light driver 
timed automata of the routes to signify movement of a train on the tracks. When the 
timed automata is not in its start(initial) state, it is running the lights sequencing turn-
ing them “green” and after the trains have left, the sequence turns them “red”. With using 
logical implication against a particular state of the point machine, it is checked that the 
mentioned point state is the only state which is observed through out. If there is any 
other state of the point than the one mentioned, then the property is negated. This signi-
fies the aspect of the interlocking model that when signals are being engaged for a route, 
the points will not change their positions. When a light timed automaton for a route 
is in its initial state, only then the points can change their positions. Therefore, smart 
point locking is achieved, which does not allow a route to be enabled which commands a 
change of position of a point to occur when the same point is used by another route.
Assured timer expiration properties
3. Error state p in timed automata is always reached if the time out x is greater than or 
equal to the stipulated time. Hence the query statement takes the shape 
Formula 3 checks the correct working of the timed automata. Formula 3 checks that 
whenever the timeout is reached or exceeded, the error state is achieved.
4. It is not possible that error state p in timed automata is reached if the time out x is 
less than the stipulated time. The timed CTL statement has the shape 
Formula 4 does its job by confirming that the error state is never falsely achieved when 
the timeout has not been approached. Since, we are using committed and urgent loca-
tions in copious amounts, whose effect on the automata is to stop time, these two 
properties are vital as they check if our watchdog timers in automata are functioning 
correctly and the timed automata is advancing correctly.
Route cancel request safety properties
5. When a route is canceled ψ ( e.g. l3.cancel) , the routes are only unlocked ϕ after the 
required Delay has passed. 
Formula 5 describes the route cancel-signal safety property. cancelsignal is a utility intro-
duced to facilitate the train dispatcher to safely cancel a route when the route signals are 
green and the target train has not entered the route. cancelsignal immediately turns the 
signals to red but only releases the points and routes when a certain delay has elapsed.
(3)p3 = AG[p⇒ x ≥ time]
(4)p4 = EF¬[p ∧ x < time]
(5)p5 = AG[ψ ⇒ AF≥Delay ϕ]
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Table 4 UPPAAL model checker verification results for route down home to number 2 plat-
form
Property CTL statement Result RAM consumed Time
p1 AG ¬route3.start ⇒ (route4.start∧route11.start ∧
route12.start∧route18.start∧route19.start)
Satisfied >25 GB >5 h
p2 AG¬l3.start ⇒ p29t.NormalPos∧p37t.NormalPos ∧
p18t.ReversePos∧p36t.ReversePos
Satisfied >10 GB >45 min
p3 for points AG rdh2.error ⇒ rdh2.x≥ 6 Satisfied >2 MB >10 min
p4 for points EF ¬ rdh2.error ∧ rdh2.x<6 Satisfied >2 MB >10 min
p3 for lights AG l3.error⇒ l3.x≥ 6 Satisfied >2 MB >10 min
p4 for lights EF¬l3.error ∧ l3.x<6 Satisfied >2 MB >10 min
p5 AG l3.cancel ⇒ AF (l3.x≥60∧ route3.clearance) Satisfied >500 MB >1 h
p6 AG rdh2.error ⇒ AF ¬route3.signal_order Satisfied >10 MB >30 min
Deadlock freeness AG (not deadlock) Satisfied >25 GB >5 h
Failsafe functionality
6. If there is an error (ψ) in setting of points, then that route will not be cleared for 
trains i.e. given green signal (ϕ). 
Formula 6 is a safety property for points in that it states that whenever an error occurs in 
moving points to their desired orientation, the traffic lights for that route will never be turned 
green. “The lights will never be turned green” is accomplished by not arriving at a location 
“signal_order” of route selection automata which instantiates the light driver timed automata 
for the routes. If this location is never reached, then lights will never be turned green.
Model checking strategy
Model checking is considered an art. When verifying properties, to avoid state explosion 
only those states are included in the model which have any effect on the outcome of the 
said property. Since the system in question is a rail yard with 18 routes, 22 lights signals 
and 27 points, it is prone to state explosion. For performing verification of the various 
safety properties, only the routes which were in conflict with each other or shared com-
mon points (Table 3) were composed in parallel composition and the aforementioned 
safety properties were verified against each of the eighteen routes in question.
Results and discussion
The system verification was performed on a linux based computational server having 
264 GB RAM. The deadlock freedom property was verified for every route in addition 
to the nine safety properties mentioned. The properties were verified with UPPAAL 
(Larsen et al. 1997) command line utility verifyta with option of reusing the state space 
for verifying multiple CTL statements. Their results for route Down Home to Number 2 
Platform are given in Table 4.
Collision freedom property
Collision freedom property for route Down Home to Number 2 Platform is described by 
AG operators stating that whenever the route selection automaton, route3, will not be in 
(6)p6 = AG[ψ ⇒ AF¬ϕ]
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its initial state i.e. ¬route3.start then it is implied that route4, route11, route12, route18 
and route19 are in their initial state i.e. start.
De‑railement avoidance property
As de-railment avoidance property is also a safety property, it is also described by the 
AG operators expressing that whenever the light sequence for a route is engaged i.e. light 
driver timed automaton, l3, is not in it initial state (i.e. ¬l3.start), then it logically implies 
that the point machines p29t and p37t will always be found in Normal while machines 
p18t and p36t will always be found in Reverse position.
Assured timer expiration properties
p3 property for both light driver (l3) and point driver (rdh2) timed automata states that 
error state (error) in timed automata is always reached when clock (x) value in these 
timed automata is six or greater. Conversely p4 property states that error state is never 
reached when the clock value is less than six.
Signal cancel properties
Whenever the light driver timed automaton is in cancel state, l3.cancel, for property p6, 
it implies that after 60 time units (clock value x greater or equal to 60), the locked out 
routes will be unlocked. This unlocking of routes (and subsequently points) is repre-
sented by clearance state in route selection automata, route3.clearance.
Fail safe functionality
This safety property states that whenever point driver timed automaton for Down Home 
to Number 2 Platform is in error state i.e. rdh2.error (ψ), then it implies that there is 
never going to be a state in which signal lights are instantiated via the signal_order state 
of route selection automaton i.e. route3.signal_order (ϕ).
Message sequencing charts
Message sequence charts (MSC) of the automata per route are obtained using Uppaal 
tool’s simulation mode. Due to the large nature of these charts, they are spread onto two 
pages, with the third page showing the cancelsignal functionality of the timed automata. 
In all these charts, the error sequencing of points and lights are not included and it is 
assumed that all points and lights are in working order.
The point automata in the MSC begin with a letter p followed by an alphanumeric 
code and light automata begin with the word light followed by an alphanumeric 
code.
The top row in the MSC shows the name of the automata, and the rectangular boxes 
below them describe the locations of that automata. The horizontal red lines pointing 
from one location of an automaton to a location of another automaton represent transi-
tions, with the channel name described above that horizontal line. The MSCs of route 
Down home to number 2 platform are shown in Figs. 18, 19 and 20.
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Fig. 18 Down home to number 2 platform. MSC for a route which paves the pathway for a train entering the 
station from the north and arriving at the number 3 platform
Conclusions
Interlocking system is a safety control system which supervises correct movement in a 
train yard. Since it is a real time safety critical system, it required modeling and exhaus-
tive verification to prevent errors being introduced into the final built design. We have 
used time automata framework to model this system by extracting real time constraints 
from this safety critical system. In this paper we presented the designed model and 
verification of automated interlocking system model of Rawalpindi Cantt train yard in 
UPPAAL toolbox (Larsen et al. 1997). The simplicity and modularity of the constructed 
design enables us to add or delete routes in a yard or append more wayside equipment 
into the already existing routes with ease. Thus, if there is a new development in the 
yard, causing an increase in conflicting routes for a particular route, the adjustment in 
the design is simply an addition of a boolean variable(s) in the route selection automata 
of that route. It is advisable for every up-gradation of the routes, conflict tables should be 
made, as shown in this study, which will help in portraying the overall effect of an addi-
tion or deletion on the whole system.
This design removes the practice of direct engagement of points by the user and only 
route choices can be taken as inputs, which increases the safety aspect of the system. 
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Even if a route cancellation is required in an emergency situation, the points are not 
directly handled by the operators and only made available after a defined delay. The 
engagement of points in an organized and orderly fashion is one of the hallmark features 
Fig. 19 Down home to number 2 platform. Sequence continued from Fig. 18
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of this design. Furthermore, this design does not completely handover the critical deci-
sion making in the yard, but keeps man in the loop as in the case of cancel signal feature.
In this paper, important properties related to the safety of the designed interlocking 
system of the railyard management system were successfully verified. These properties 
Fig. 20 Down home to number 2 platform. This MSC shows an alternative sequence starting from where 
Fig. 18 ends and where an order to cancel the signal is observed, otherwise the MSC remains the same as 
Fig. 19
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ranged from collision and de-railment avoidance to checking the correct error handling 
functionality of the timed automata models.
A modern rail management system for the Rawalpindi Cantt train station can be con-
structed by making these verified models a reference for the design and development 
of the interface and the infrastructure layers of the rail management system which has 
a huge potential in saving costs of importing international solutions for our railroading 
needs.
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